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➲ Security Policies from a Spatial Perspective: 
the Case of Honduras
Introduction
Public insecurity became a central issue for many Hondurans in the late 1990s, as
crime, delinquency and homicide increased significantly in the isthmus. Honduras had
the second highest homicide rate (35.1 per 100,000) in the region after El Salvador (50.2.
per 100,000) (World Health Organization 2002). This social violence triggered insecuri-
ty and fear, which was further accompanied by the overall perception that the state was
unable of relieving or protecting the population.
In 2002, the Honduran government attempted to reduce social violence by introduc-
ing various repressive security policies known as Cero Tolerancia (Zero Tolerance),
Mano Dura (Iron Fist) and the Ley Antimaras (Anti-Gang Law). These security policies
aimed at stopping crime by incarcerating members of the violent youth gangs (maras)
that were officially held responsible for social violence and public insecurity. These
security policies soon proved to be inefficient: not only did crime and homicide rates
remain high, but security forces were unable to impose control over certain urban areas –
that is, gang-controlled barrios – as well as over gang members. On the one hand, youth
gangs developed sophisticated territorial strategies which enabled them to defy state
authorities in the neighborhoods and in prison (Gutiérrez Rivera 2009, 2010). On the
other hand, state authorities had weak territorial strategies for controlling relationships in
marginal urban areas.
This article looks at the failed attempts of the Honduran state to stop social violence
and to control youth gang expansion by focusing on the security policies Cero Toleran-
cia (Zero Tolerance), Mano Dura (Iron Fist) and the Ley Antimaras (Anti-Gang Law). It
understands security policies as territorial strategies that attempt to reduce social vio-
lence and impose control. Using a spatial-analytical framework, this article shows that
the Honduran government’s territorial strategies are fragile and inefficient because of the
organization of urban space, namely because of the absence of territorial hierarchies and
fragmentation. In using a spatial-analytical framework, this article expects to deepen our
understanding of a weak state’s failed attempts to control complex forms of social vio-
lence in a post-dictatorial setting. 
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The structure of this article is as follows: the section that follows discusses the emer-
gence of social violence, public (in)security and youth gang expansion in Honduras and
Central America. This section also discusses studies on security policies in Central
America and the importance of understanding them from a spatial perspective. The sec-
ond section develops a spatial-analytical framework used to study security policies. The
third section analyzes the above-mentioned security policies showing the attempts made
by the Honduran authorities to territorialize power and the difficulties they experienced.
The final section reflects on these failed security policies and territorial strategies in
Honduras.
Social violence, (in)security, and security policies in Honduras and Central
America
Security policies were introduced in Central America at the turn of the twenty-first
century as a response to the wave of social violence in the region and the general percep-
tion of public insecurity among the population. Hence, security policies are closely relat-
ed to the emergence of new and complex forms of violence, namely urban violence (see
also Dirk Kruijt’s article in this Dossier). This social violence differs greatly from the
political violence that traditionally has characterized the isthmus. It did not come from
an organized political group (Rotker 2002). Rather, social violence is ubiquitous and tar-
get indiscriminately everyone (Torres-Rivas 1999). Though affecting all of the Central
American countries, the highest levels of violence are concentrated in the northern part
of the isthmus: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Social violence is not new in Honduras. Newspapers first started reporting the vari-
ous forms of new violence – such as delinquency, crime, homicide – in the late 1970s,
and these forms of violence began to increase slowly over the following decades
(Salomón 1993). The 1990s, however, saw a sharp rise in urban violence. Reports of
delinquency and crime increased substantially between 1998 and 2000. By 2000, the
homicide rate was at 46.31 per 100,000 in Honduras’ main cities, San Pedro Sula and
Tegucigalpa. San Pedro Sula witnessed a much higher level of violence than Tegucigal-
pa; the homicide rate there was 107 per 100,000, doubling Tegucigalpa’s rate at 52
(Castellanos 2000). 
Social violence in Honduras has a strong masculine component, as most of the male
population participate in and/or fall victim to different forms of violence. Male aggres-
sors make up 97.5 per cent of all aggressors, whereas male victims make up 92 per cent
of all victims. In addition, violence is usually committed with heavy caliber firearms,
which are used by the military. Nevertheless, arms such as AK-47s, Galils and mini-Uzis
circulate widely in Honduras, a legacy of the civil war period of the 1980s. 
These observations coincide with international reports on violence. The World Health
Organization (2002) reports that Latin America, and particularly Central America and the
Caribbean, have registered the highest levels of social violence in the world in recent
decades. Furthermore, this report confirmed that most of the violence was carried out by
male adolescents and young adults. Local studies indicate that the majority of these male
teenagers and adults are members of youth gangs or “maras” (Salomón 1993; Salomón/
Flores/Castellanos 1999; Save the Children/Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes 2001). 
Rev41-01  10/3/11  11:56  Página 144
Central American youth gangs have recently garnered scholarly attention. Although
they emerged in Central America in the early 1960s as non-aggressive peer groups, gangs
eventually turned into violent organizations in the 1980s and proliferated in the early
1990s (Salomón 1993; UNDP 2003). Studies show that youth gang expansion is closely
associated with the rise of social violence in the region (Save the Children/Asociación
Cristiana de Jóvenes 2001; ERIC 2005; Rodgers 2006, 2007; Savenije 2009; Salomón/
Flores/Castellanos 1999). This is due to structural factors on the macro and micro levels
leading to the emergence of complex forms of violence. Gang activities such as territori-
al disputes with rival gangs, control over marginal neighborhoods and residents, and
gangs’ occasional involvement in criminal acts as well as drug distribution on a minor
scale indicate how deeply embedded violence is in Honduran (and Central American)
society. Though gang violence accounted for only 1.7 per cent in registered police reports
(Cálix 2004), the general perception among Hondurans was that gangs were carrying out
most of the social violence and inciting public insecurity. The latter was reinforced
through constant media reports and, later, the presidential campaigns in 2001. 
What were the structural factors behind the rise of social violence in recent decades
and youth gang expansion in Honduras? Neo-liberal policies in the late eighties are one
factor. Studies show that Honduras was one of the first countries in Central America to
implement a neo-liberal agenda that enabled free trade and flexible labor contracts
(Otazo Conde 2001; Jelín 1994; Robinson 2003). The country’s limited state apparatus
and institutions as well as the inability of the leftist and/or central-leftist parties to devel-
op an alternative political project explain the minimal resistance that actors such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund encountered in Honduras. Robinson
(2003) shows that neo-liberal policies increased poverty and retracted the state from tra-
ditional social services (like health care) despite energizing Honduras’ (and Central
America’s) stagnant economy. Honduras witnessed the emergence of a new urban poor
who had little or no access to social services and become more prone to violence, crimi-
nality and delinquency (Moser/McIlwaine 2004). 
Social violence is also linked to the region’s democratization process. Koonings and
Kruijt (1999) point out that the democratization process established formal democracies
which nevertheless continued to sponsor political violence and to militarize society and
state institutions. This explains the prevalence of authoritarian practices in Central Amer-
ica. Scholarship on Honduras notices that an unfinished demilitarization process and an
entrenched bipartisan system which tends to exclude various social sectors has hindered
the establishment of a representative democracy – thus the prevalence of authoritarian
practices and violence – and of a strong civil society (Maihold 1995; Torres Calderón
1998; Posas 2003). On the other hand, Zinecker (2008) states that the increase in vio-
lence is associated with changes in Honduras’ “balance system”. This balance system
historically managed to exclude violence through negotiations and reforms. However,
this system underwent political and economic changes in the late seventies and the new
financial elite of the nineties turned it into a more “preventive structure”, which, as it did
not negotiate, was unable to deal with new forms of violence. 
Youth gang expansion and gang violence in Honduras (and Central America) unfold-
ed within the structural processes mentioned above. Gang membership rose among ado-
lescents and young adults in the eighties (Salomón 1993). Furthermore, gang members
became more involved in violent practices and criminality, partly because of alcohol and
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drug consumption. Local gangs underwent considerable transformation, not only did they
attract marginal adolescents and young adults, but their organizational structure also
turned from loose and simple into complex and fixed (Salomón/Flores/Castellanos 1999). 
Studies indicate that local gangs became affiliated to two large transnational gangs
known as the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street Gang (ERIC 2005; Savenije 2009;
Peetz 2004). Both gangs originated in Southern California’s Hispanic neighborhoods
and expanded to other cities in the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras. This was because of migration, namely the deportation from the United States
of former and active gang members to their ‘homeland’1. Not much is known about the
deportees’ arrival in Honduras, however, studies suggest that deportees introduced new
organizational structures and sophisticated forms of violence to local gangs (ERIC/
IDESO/IDIES/IUDOP 2001; ERIC 2005; Save the Children/Asociación Cristiana de
Jóvenes 2001).
Initially, gangs used violence against their members (for instance, female gang mem-
bers) or rival gangs (to defend their turf). However, in the 1990s, gangs started using vio-
lence against residents of the neighborhoods they controlled. They collected a “war tax”,
that is, money from barrio stores and residents in order to cover their own expenses, and
attacked public transportation (taxis, buses) and pedestrians (ERIC/IDESO/IDIES/
IUDOP 2001; Gutiérrez Rivera 2009). 
Central American governments, particularly in Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala, responded to the proliferation of new social violence, public insecurity, and
youth gangs with repressive security policies known as Cero Tolerancia, Mano Dura,
and Ley Antimaras. Studies focusing on state repression and/or government security
policies in a post-revolutionary or post-dictatorial setting have only recently started to
appear. Security policies are generally perceived as the return – or prevalence – of
authoritarian practices, the weakness of state institutions (particularly the judiciary insti-
tutions) and democratization processes, as well as the re-militarization of society (Blan-
co Reyes 2004; Cálix 2004; González 2003). An institutional approach has predominat-
ed in these studies. It has been useful for understanding the inability of recently
democratized states to deal with complex socio-cultural phenomena, particularly the
youth gangs or “maras”. Furthermore, institutional analysis indicates the fragility of the
judiciary system, as enforcement agents have demonstrated difficulties in carrying out
and interpreting laws.
Other studies go beyond the institutional approach and focus on state institutions’
involvement in the promotion – rather than the control/reduction – of violence (Hume
2007; Peetz 2008; Peetz/Huhn 2008; Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2008). They show that official
statistics tend to be exaggerated. Hence, violence, fear, and public (in)security are con-
structed and reproduced in various communicative spaces, most noticeably the mass
media (newspapers, radio, television). In addition, security policies emerge within these
discourses as an instrument which the state uses to construct the “other” through the
dehumanization and criminalization of youth, thus legitimizing their persecution. 
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1 Gang members were deported to their country of origin even though they had never lived there. Hence,
“homeland” is somehow ironic, as gang members did not feel they had arrived home. Indeed, they felt
they were treated as foreigners (Zilberg 2003). 
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There has been hardly any analysis of security policies from a spatial perspective.
Zilberg’s (2003) study on US-immigration policies and Salvadorian youth comes
closest. It shows how national policies are directly involved in the physical and geo-
graphical displacement of youth through forced migration (that is, deportation) and
how deported youth is forced to build space and identity in unknown and unfriendly
urban spaces (for instance, in San Salvador). Furthermore, national policies promote
marginalization and strip youth of citizenship. Even if the precise focus of Zilberg’s
work lies elsewhere, it provides rich insight into the importance of using a spatial-
analytical framework for understanding (failed) attempts at implementing security
policies. 
Understanding security policies from a spatial perspective
Drawing on contemporary political geography theory, this article develops an analyt-
ical framework that enables, on the one hand, an understanding of the modern state’s
logic towards its territory and, on the other hand, the perception of security policies as
territorial strategies for imposing control. 
All states are bound to territory. The state binds itself through its apparatuses and
institutions which aim at monopolizing the procedures of capital accumulation and the
organization of territory. Furthermore, the state exercises state power over specific ter-
ritories and individuals (Poulantzas 1978). In the attempt to monopolize the social
relations within a given area as well as to rationally organize space, the state emerges
as an authority (Lefebvre 2003). The state develops and imposes territorial strategies
in order to secure a particular outcome, for instance, the re-spatialization of capital, the
(re)allocation of resources or peoples, or the production of national territory. Hence,
state territorial strategies, or territoriality, are closely linked to sovereignty: “[A] given
state does not just exist in space, it has sovereign power in a particular territory”
(Lefebvre 2003: 101).
Brenner, drawing on Lefebvre’s seminal works, perceives state territorial strategies
as a “violence directed towards space” (1999: 49) in which the state seeks to dominate
and control space by rationalizing, unifying, and homogenizing the social relations with-
in social space. As Lefebvre points out, capitalist states aim to produce homogenized
space – usually by hierarchizing and fragmenting space – for more efficient control,
which means that states do not always produce unified and homogeneous spaces: “Each
state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished, a space, even, where
something is brought to perfection: namely, a unified and hence homogeneous society”
(Lefebvre, quoted in Brenner 1999: 49). 
State territorial strategies should be understood as a process through which the
state attempts to monopolize and unify social relations and, eventually, expects to pro-
duce a specific spatial outcome. Contemporary political geography theory has criti-
cized the perception of territorial strategies, or state territoriality, as a given or as ahis-
torical, observing that such notions have contributed to fixing geographical
assumptions, such as that territorial strategies necessarily produce enclosed or encaged
spaces or that they are organized on a national scale (Brenner/Jessop/Jones/MacLeod
2003; Brenner 2004, 1999). 
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This article therefore focuses on the territorial strategies of the Honduran state with-
in a specific historical context: social violence and youth gang expansion of the past
decade. Between 2002 and 2005 the Honduran state attempted to reduce social violence
and stop youth gang expansion: to this end the authorities developed territorial strate-
gies, namely security policies, to impose control. Proceeding from the view that security
policies are territorial strategies that emerge within the context of social violence and
public (in)security, this article analyzes the territorial strategies the authorities used to
reduce social violence and to stop youth gang expansion, as well as the challenges they
faced. 
Territorial strategies are analyzed using Sack’s definition of territoriality, conceived
as a geographic strategy for enforcing control over objects and persons by controlling a
specific area, “[territoriality is] the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence,
or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over
a geographic area. This area will be called the territory” (Sack 1986: 19).
Territory here does not refer to the circumscription or delimitation of space. Territory
is not fixed or enclosed; instead, it is an active area where an individual or a group
attempts to influence the interactions of other groups or individuals. In other words, ter-
ritory is an area of “socio-political struggles” (Brenner 2004) which change or transform
space. In addition, these socio-political struggles are perceived as the territorial strate-
gies of a group or an individual. 
Sack identifies three interdependent relationships that reveal the logic of territorial
strategies: classification, communication, and the assertion of control over an area.
The first relationship refers to the classification of an area. Simply put, classification
occurs when a group or an individual claims possession over anything (or some things)
in a specific area. In addition, classification marks the inclusion and exclusion of oth-
ers from entering or gaining access to an area. The second relationship states that a
group or an individual must communicate the area it classifies. It is a way of symboli-
cally marking territory. Territorial boundaries are the most common and powerful
forms of communication. Signs or gestures are considered forms of communication.
Like classification, communication indicates possession and exclusion of an area.
Finally, the third relationship involves asserting control over a specific area. In other
words, the group or individual attempt to influence the struggles and interactions with-
in a given space usually by controlling access within an area or to people or objects
outside the area. 
Territorial strategies are not particular to the modern state. They are ubiquitous and
can be carried out by non-state actors, who may also attempt to affect interactions and
movements in certain contexts and circumstances. In the case of the state, territorial
strategies not only aim to control the procedures of capital accumulation and to influence
the peoples in a given space, they also have a symbolic purpose: that the state be
acknowledged as the legitimate authority.
Here, Honduran security policies are perceived as an effort to influence certain terri-
tories and groups within the specific context of social violence. Security policies target
gang-controlled areas and members of the Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street Gang. Sym-
bolically, these territorial strategies are a state effort to reinstate authority. The next sec-
tion analyzes the territorial strategies of the Honduran state authorities as well as the
challenges authorities encountered in implementing them.
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Security policies as a territorial strategy: Imposing authority
In 2002, Ricardo Maduro of the Partido Nacional (National Party, PN) was sworn in
as president after a successful campaign that crushed his main opponent, José Manuel
Zelaya of the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party, PL).2 His campaign, Futuro Seguro (Safe
Future) promised to stop social violence by fighting crime in Honduras.
Once in office, Maduro declared war on criminals, announcing harsh security poli-
cies. In 2002 his administration introduced Zero Tolerance, and in the following year it
approved first Iron Fist and, later in the year, the Anti-Gang Law. These security policies
imitated Giuliani’s “broken window policing” or order maintenance policing, brought in
to control crime in New York in the mid-nineties. On a general level, these policies
involved police, military, and security forces being actively on patrol and looking for
criminals in neighborhoods with high levels of violence. The Anti-Gang Law specifical-
ly sought the disbandment of gangs by proclaiming them illegal associations and incar-
cerating their members. Most of the neighborhoods where the patrolling took place were
located in peripheral areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. Furthermore, most of
these neighborhoods were under control of the Mara Salvatrucha or the 18th Street Gang.
Maduro’s security policies were territorial strategies, as they were intended to influ-
ence and control relationships and interactions in crime-infested urban areas by sending
police and security agents to patrol their streets and incarcerate gang members. Zero Tol-
erance and Iron Fist aimed principally at controlling and imposing authority in gang-con-
trolled neighborhoods, whereas the Anti-Gang Law targeted gang members. In the former,
authorities clearly determined (or classified) and communicated (for instance, through
main and local media outlets) the areas where “security” would be enforced. Raids and
street patrolling were the government’s territorial strategies for asserting control over
these urban areas. A typical raid involved heavily armed police and security agents and
the presence of president Maduro and his Secretary of Defense: “Maduro headed an
impressive police raid in a barrio in Comayagüela. 250 police and military agents, with
the aid of helicopters, did the raid. The area was militarized” (El Heraldo, 2 July 2003). 
Raids like these became routine in 2002, and increased in 2003. The raids and street
patrolling eventually led to the incarceration of “criminals and delinquents”. Most of
those arrested, however, were gang members of the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street
Gang, who were officially held responsible for the social violence. Yet it became increas-
ingly difficult to incarcerate them. As police agents were unable to prove gang members’
“crimes”, judicial authorities were forced to release them. At the beginning of 2003, gov-
ernment officials announced a reduction in the age of criminal accountability as a means
of fighting crime and incarcerating gangs (La Tribuna, 25 January 2003). But this reduc-
tion never materialized, in part due to the disapproval in Congress of representatives of
the leftist party, Unión Democrática (UD), as well as local youth associations and orga-
nizations. Instead, PN representatives proposed a change to the penal code. In August
2003, after a weekend of violence in Tegucigalpa, Congress approved this reform, also
known as the Anti-Gang Law.3
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2 José Manuel Zelaya (PL) would win the next presidential elections in 2005.
3 Congress reformed Article 332 of the Penal Code. This came to be widely known as Ley Antimaras
(Anti-Gang Law), although it was not really a law.
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The Anti-Gang Law legitimized the incarceration of gang members on the grounds
of membership alone rather than for any criminal action.4 For state authorities, the Anti-
Gang Law enabled more efficiency in imposing territorial control over crime-infested
neighborhoods, as the subjects/criminals had been officially pinpointed. As a govern-
ment official stated: “With the approval of the Anti-Gang Law, police work will be more
efficient because now they will have more control over the ‘mareros’ [gang members]
and they will not be easily freed” (El Tiempo, 8 August 2003).
The Anti-Gang Law allowed security and police agents to arrest gang members in
flagrante delicto. As arrests could be based on appearance alone (instead of on criminal
action), gangs’ own visible territoriality such as hanging out on the streets and, particu-
larly, their territoriality of the body (hip-hop style, shaved heads, and especially their tat-
toos) made them easily identifiable for state authorities. Shortly after introducing the
Anti-Gang Law, security and police forces raided gang-controlled barrios arresting gang
members and young adults who looked like gang members.5
On the symbolic level, the three main security policies sought to modify the state’s
tarnished image, which had suffered from its inability to impose its sovereignty where
violence and security issues were concerned. Interestingly, police raids were given sym-
bolic names that had clear references to territorial sovereignty or to claiming territory on
behalf of the state: the police raids in 2003 were named Operación Libertad (Operation
Freedom), for instance. Furthermore, the idea of “liberating” or “freeing” marginal
neighborhoods from crime, violence, and gangs was reinforced with extensive media
coverage. Newspapers and television news circulated images of security and police
agents and top government officials, such as the president and the Secretary of Defense,
“capturing” criminals. Symbolic territorial claiming was also the state’s attempt to assert
control and (re)establish new urban boundaries. As Newman observes, boundaries have
power: “Once created, boundaries become almost mythical, inasmuch as they determine
the sovereign and inviolable limits of the state, not to be transgressed by external pow-
ers” (Newman 2005: 92).
In conclusion, symbolically and physically, security policies attempted to affect
interactions in crime-infested neighborhoods and among gang members by reshaping
social space. However, as the next section shows, territorial strategies faced several seri-
ous challenges.
Difficulties of imposing territorial strategies
For various reasons, Honduran state authorities encountered many obstacles to their
imposition of these territorial strategies. One of them was structural. State institutions
have been historically weak, making institutionalized territorial enforcement challeng-
ing. Honduras’ state formation processes in the 19th century did not consolidate an effi-
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4 The new Article 332 established gangs as illicit organizations and associations, thereby criminalizing
gang membership. Additionally, ringleaders would receive even harsher punishment with twelve-year
prison sentences and fines.
5 For instance, many young adults with tattoos who were not gang members were arrested. 
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cient state apparatus. Indeed, statehood was not achieved until the 1950s. In the thirty
years that followed, military dictatorships sought to expand the state apparatus and to
establish a more prominent role for the state. A precarious infrastructure of social wel-
fare was set up (Posas/del Cid 1983), which was dismantled, however, with the neo-lib-
eral policies of the nineties.
Another structural obstacle were Honduras’ limited state resources, inseparable from
the historical difficulties the Honduran state experienced consolidating its fiscal base,
which left it structurally dependent on powerful capitalist states and, more recently,
transnational actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Secu-
rity policies required various resources (financial, physical, and spatial) that the govern-
ment simply did not count on. Not only did security policies substantially increase gov-
ernment spending, the security apparatus also did not have enough manpower for
territorial enforcement in the classified areas (Gutiérrez Rivera 2009).
The two largest gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street were hard to control.
Gang members challenged police and security agents with their own territorial strategies.
As I have written elsewhere (Gutiérrez Rivera 2010), security policies reinforced gang
territoriality, enabling gang members to outwit authorities in their neighborhoods or defy
them outright in prison. For instance, members altered the territoriality of the body (they
started dressing differently and restricted tattoo use) as well as their movements in the
barrio streets: “[The gangs] are in a process of mutation, they have changed their styles
and forms and are readapting […]. Since the [Anti-Gang] law, members do not tattoo
themselves anymore, they don’t dispute the barrio, they stopped walking down the street
with their typical tumbao, and they do not hang around corners anymore” (El Heraldo,
17 May 2004).
The sophistication of gang territoriality was indicative of the ability of gang mem-
bers’ to respond to state repression by reshaping territory and producing new spaces in
the neighborhoods. Gangs’ territorial know-how highlighted the inability of the state’s
territorial strategy to affect relationships, objects, gang members, as well as to impose
power. Whereas gang members demonstrated authority and knowledge of their local
turfs and neighborhoods, police and security agents did not seem to know the areas they
raided. This was in part because of the absence or limited presence of state institutions
at the local level. The central authorities had virtually no partners in these areas. The
absence or limited presence of the state in marginal areas has been thoroughly
researched in previous studies (Wacquant 2001; Bourgois 1996; Zatz/Portillos 2000;
Venkatesh 1997). On the one hand, this fragile materiality of the state has favored the
predominance (and consolidation) of gang organizations over local community associa-
tions. On the other hand, it handicaps central authorities’ policing efforts in marginal
areas, as they have little territorial knowledge of the places in which they set out to
impose rule. 
The way in which the Honduran authorities organize space – that is, national territo-
ry and urban space – is central in understanding the territorial limitations on police and
security agents’ attempts to effectively implement security policies in marginal barrios.
National territory is divided into departments, which are further fragmented into munici-
palities. The municipality is the smallest territorial unit in Honduras, and cities are terri-
torially organized and administered by a municipality (Ley de Municipalidades, Hon-
duran Constitution 1982).
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Honduras’ main cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, are both cities and munici-
palities. Although the Catastro Municipal (Land Registry) registers private property
and the Servicio Autónomo Nacional de Acueducto y Alcantarillado (National Service
of Aqueducts and Sewage, or SANAA) regulate urban construction, city-municipalities
do not group neighborhoods and residential areas under local politico-administrations
such as a district, county or locality. This non-fragmentation of urban space into smaller
territorial units makes domination of certain urban territories – particularly in the mar-
ginal areas where the state is absent – and the efficient re-spatialization of resources,
objects, and individuals difficult. The analyse of the security policies clearly illustrated
this, as security and police forces did not rely on local authorities such as town coun-
cilors or local police agents who could help them gain access, knowledge, and control
over marginal urban areas. The government sent agents to patrol streets which were
basically foreign to them. Indeed, marginal barrios had a very different territorial logic
which was imposed and dominated by the gangs. In addition, gang territorial strategies
spatialized (through the use of violence) residents’ relationships and movements, thus
enabling gang members to gain control and dominance over turfs and/or neighborhoods
and residents.
Conclusion
This article aims to explain Honduras’ failed security policies by using a spatial-ana-
lytical framework. Specifically, this article sought to answer which territorial strategies
state authorities used to impose control and power and what challenges authorities faced.
The analysis shows that state authorities were unable to develop a territorial strategy of
sovereignty to control violence, reduce crime and delinquency, and control gang mem-
bers of the Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street Gang. One reason for this is the structur-
al weakness of Honduras’ institutions and its limited resources for territorializing securi-
ty policies. The fragility of the Honduran state apparatus and the lack of resource
infrastructure are linked to the country’s state formation process. In addition, recent
processes, such as neo-liberalism and market-friendly policies enabling more flexible
capital and labor laws, have contributed to retracting the state from its social role.
Another factor is the gangs’ response to security policies and general state repres-
sion. Gang members developed their own territorial strategies demonstrating the weak-
ness underlying the state’s own territorial strategy for exercising power. In addition,
the territoriality of the gang highlights the Honduran authorities’ distinct way of orga-
nizing political territory. For instance, Honduran state territoriality does not follow tra-
ditional organizational procedures that lead to the formation of a predominantly
“homogenous and unified” political space. The non-fragmentation of urban territories
can be understood as the inability to fragment for more efficient territorial control.
However, non-fragmentation of political (urban) space is also indicative of a different
and non-traditional use given and ascribed to territory. Against this background, I want
to close this article with a plea for more empirical research within a spatial-analytical
framework to aid our understanding of urban spatiality in Honduras and Central Amer-
ica and the role it plays in organizing or producing violence as well as in consolidating
state power. 
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